Exploring the impact of different cost heuristics in the allocation of safety integrity levels by Papadopoulos, Yiannis et al.
Exploring the Impact of Different Cost Heuristics in the 
Allocation of Safety Integrity Levels 
Luís Silva Azevedo1, David Parker1, Yiannis Papadopoulos1, Martin Walker1, Ioannis 
Sorokos1, Rui Esteves Araújo2 
1Department of Computer Science, University of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom 
l.p.azevedo@2012.hull.ac.uk, {d.j.parker, y.i.papadopoulos, 
martin.walker}@hull.ac.uk, i.sorokos@2012.hull.ac.uk 
2INESC TEC, Faculdade de Engenharia, Universidade do Porto, Portugal 
raraujo@fe.up.pt 
Abstract. Contemporary safety standards prescribe processes in which system 
safety requirements, captured early and expressed in the form of Safety Integri-
ty Levels (SILs), are iteratively allocated to architectural elements. Different 
SILs reflect different requirements stringencies and consequently different de-
velopment costs. Therefore, the allocation of safety requirements is not a simple 
problem of applying an allocation "algebra" as treated by most standards; it is a 
complex optimisation problem, one of finding a strategy that minimises cost 
whilst meeting safety requirements. One difficulty is the lack of a commonly 
agreed heuristic for how costs increase between SILs. In this paper, we define 
this important problem; then we take the example of an automotive system and 
using an automated approach show that different cost heuristics lead to different 
optimal SIL allocations. Without automation it would have been impossible to 
explore the vast space of allocations and to discuss the subtleties involved in 
this problem.  
Keywords. Dependability Analysis; Requirements Analysis; Functional Safety; 
SIL Allocation and Decomposition; Cost Optimisation 
1 Introduction 
Safety Standards, such as IEC 61508, ISO 26262, and ARP4754-A, introduce a 
system of classification for different levels of safety: IEC 61508 popularised the Safe-
ty Integrity Level (SIL), while ISO 26262 and ARP4754-A introduced domain-
specific versions of this concept — the Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) for 
the automotive domain and the Development Assurance Level (DAL) for the aero-
space domain. All of these serve as qualitative indicators of the required level of safe-
ty of a function or component, and generally they are broken down into 5 levels, rang-
ing from strict requirements (e.g. SIL4, ASIL D, DAL A) to no special requirements 
(e.g. SIL0, QM, DAL E). These safety levels are employed as part of a top-down 
requirements distribution process. We focus on ISO 26262 guidelines as we will be 
analysing an automotive system; however, other standards prescribe analogous rules 
for requirements definition, allocation and decomposition. In ISO 26262 the process 
of elicitation starts with a hazard and risk analysis which identifies the various mal-
functions that may take place and what hazards may arise as a result. The severity, 
likelihood, and controllability of these hazards are then considered, and on the basis 
of this risk analysis, an ASIL is assigned to them; this ASIL assignment is intended to 
generate the necessary requirements throughout the system architecture that ensure 
that any risks will be decreased to an acceptable level. At this point, system level 
safety requirements, termed Safety Goals (SGs), are formulated, linked to system 
functions and inherit the ASILs of the hazard they are meant to prevent. 
During subsequent development of the system, traceability to the original ASILs is 
maintained at all times. As the system design is refined into more detailed architec-
tures, the original ASILs are allocated and can be decomposed throughout new sub-
components and sub-functions of the design. ISO 26262 prescribes an "ASIL algebra" 
to guide this process, where the various integrity levels are translated into integers 
(ASIL QM = 0; A = 1; B = 2; C = 3 and D = 4). The algebra is essentially an abstrac-
tion and simplification of techniques for combining probabilities under assumptions 
of statistical independence of failures. In this approach, components that can directly 
cause the corruption of a SG are assigned with the ASIL of that hazard; if, on the 
other hand, multiple independent components must fail together to cause a SG viola-
tion, they are allowed to share the burden of complying with the ASIL of that SG; the 
rationale here is that the components’ total ASIL must add up to the safety level of the 
SG. For example, a safety level like ASIL B can be met by two independent compo-
nents which each individually only meeting ASIL A (and thus effectively A + A = B). 
In following the decomposition rules, there are various concerns. The first concern 
is raised by the complexity of modern safety-critical systems. The trend is for these 
architectures to become systems of systems, where multiple functions are delivered 
by complex networked architectural topologies and where functions can share com-
ponents. The ISO standard is lacking in providing examples and detailed guidelines to 
support ASIL allocation in these systems. Possibly due to this lack of clarity, practi-
tioners often make mistakes [1]. Furthermore, the safety engineer’s tasks include un-
derstanding architectural failure behaviour, ensuring that component failure inde-
pendence constraints are met, working efficiently through the many possible combi-
nations for allocations, and confirming that the decomposed low-level requirements 
still add up to the original high-level requirements. Performing all of these manually 
in such complex architectures is practically impossible, and here again the standard 
fails to give guidance on automated support.  
The second concern relates to the way SIL decomposition is being formulated in 
the standards as a problem solely focused on safety, where the single goal is to arrive 
at an allocation of integrity requirements to components of the system architecture 
that fulfils a set of properly elicited system level safety requirements. Naturally, 
standards are focused on safety, so cost implications are not really considered. On the 
other hand, there is no doubt that the cost implications of SIL allocation are very rele-
vant to developers of systems. We believe there are benefits to be found if the prob-
lem of safety requirement allocation is defined in a broader way which includes costs. 
 
Indeed, developing a component according to a given SIL, means that a set of devel-
opment and validation activities needs to be undertaken. They are translated into time, 
efforts and in the end costs, and vary with the specific SIL prescribed to a component. 
Potentially, many allocation possibilities may be available, and in order to find the 
most advantageous, the problem needs to consider their different cost implications. To 
illustrate the issue, we need to turn to the very fundamentals of the techniques de-
scribed in the standards. ISO 26262 gives a range of options for ASIL decomposition. 
For example a function with an SG that requires ASIL B can be implemented with an 
architecture of two components which, assuming that they fail independently, may 
inherit ASILs B and QM or A and A respectively When such options exist, cost typi-
cally provides the deciding criterion. This is precisely where the development cost 
differences implied by different ASILs can reveal decomposition strategies that are 
more cost-effective than others. During the design phase, when requirement allocation 
and decomposition take place, exact development costs are naturally hard to obtain. 
However, cost analyses can still be made on the basis of some heuristic that expresses 
the relative cost differences of complying with the different ASILs. For example, 
taking the above example, if considering a logarithmic cost increase between ASILs 
(ASIL QM = 0; A = 10; B = 100; C = 1000; D = 10000), when decomposing a SIL B 
amongst two components, C1 and C2, one single optimal solution is revealed. 
 C1 (ASIL QM) + C2 (ASIL B): 0 + 100 = 100; 
 C1 (ASIL A) + C2 (ASIL A): 10 + 10 = 20; 
 C1 (ASIL B) + C2 (ASIL QM) = 100. 
 
The example must be read carefully, not to suggest that the above is a trivial problem 
where decomposition opportunities can be examined independently. Components are 
often participating in multiple functions and numerous chains of conflicting con-
straints must be examined to find cost-optimal SIL allocations. This is a complex 
combinatorial problem where the satisfaction of safety requirements is simply a con-
straint that must be met, while the real objective is the optimisation of cost.  
It is important to stress that this is not a hypothetical, but a real, important and per-
tinent problem. The concern about cost implications of ASILs is already evident in 
the automotive domain. Indeed, there has been continuous discussion within the au-
tomotive Functional Safety community to determine an appropriate ASIL cost heuris-
tic (see for example ISO 26262 LinkedIn Forum [2]). One proposal, for instance, 
suggests that the cost increase between ASIL B and C is bigger than the ones from A 
to B and C to D. We believe that the community is aware of the importance of a plau-
sible cost heuristic for estimating the costs of meeting safety requirements. In this 
paper we want to advance this discussion further by showing, with the aid of automa-
tion, that what can be seen as "optimal satisfaction" of safety requirement is in fact 
defined by the nature of this cost heuristic. 
In section 2 we briefly outline a recently developed method for a largely automat-
ed, cost-aware, model-based allocation of safety requirements in the form of SILs. In 
section 3 we apply this method to a case study performed on an automotive hybrid 
braking system. We assume two different cost heuristics and discuss the implications 
for SIL allocation. Finally in section 4 we summarise, conclude and point to future 
work.  
2 Automatic and Optimal Decomposition of SILs 
To address some of the concerns discussed above, we have recently been develop-
ing techniques [3, 4] to help automate SIL allocation and decomposition processes by 
extending the framework of the model-based dependability analysis tool HiP-HOPS 
(Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies) [5]. HiP-HOPS is 
built around the concept of annotating the components of a system model with local 
failure logic.  From these local descriptions, HiP-HOPS can synthesise fault trees for 
the whole system, describing how the individual component failures can propagate 
throughout the rest of the system and lead to hazardous conditions in the system out-
put functionality. HiP-HOPS is aware of which components are independent by 
means of the assumption made in the fault propagation model and the fault tree analy-
sis and it can automatically determine the opportunities for requirements decomposi-
tion. On the basis of this information, the tool next establishes a set of constraints 
based on the ASIL 'algebra' described by ISO 26262, but it can also use any analo-
gous rules from standards affecting other industry sectors, such as the aerospace in-
dustry. Finally, HiP-HOPS initiates a search for the ASIL allocations that, while ful-
filling such requirements constraints, minimize the total system’s ASIL dependent 
costs according to some cost heuristic defined by the system designer. In related 
work, Mader et al [6] built a linear programming problem to minimize the sum of 
ASILs assigned to an architecture. In the aerospace sector, Bieber, Delmas and Seguin 
[7] used pseudo-Boolean logic to formulate the DAL decomposition problem; similar-
ly to the work presented by Mader et al, the sum of DALs across the components of a 
system is minimized. In both cases, this can be understood as utilizing a linear fitness 
function to evaluate the different SIL allocation alternatives; the costs implications of 
each integrity level increase proportionally to the integer assigned to them by the SIL 
algebras. Assuming a linear cost growth is fairly simplistic and the use of other cost 
heuristics can be validly applied.  
Our early research has shown that the number of potential combinations of alloca-
tions typically produces a vast search space. Therefore, recent work has focused on 
the use of metaheuristics that are known to be efficient in exploring large search spac-
es. Furthermore, meta-heuristics include the versatility, not present in many determin-
istic algorithms, to solve problems with different characteristics; this is important as 
we allow the system designer to input any ASIL cost function, and these have impli-
cations in the nature of the optimisation problem. Initial investigation on this has in-
cluded implementations of genetic algorithms [8], a metaheuristic based on the con-
cept of natural evolution, where a set of candidate solutions evolve, through crosso-
ver and mutation operations, during a fixed number of generations into (near) optimal 
solutions. More recently we have found significant improvements in solution quality 
and processing efficiency using a Tabu search technique [9] which is based on the 
work of Hansen and Lih [10]. In Tabu Search a single solution exists at any given 
 
iteration. Specialized local search algorithms are used for that solution to travel 
throughout the search space together with memory mechanisms that increase diversity 
and grant global exploration capabilities to the algorithm. Our technique makes use of 
a steepest descent approach for neighbourhood exploration: the cost reductions of 
decrementing each of the ASILs in the current solution are analysed and the failure 
mode’s ASIL for which this cost variation is the highest is decremented. When dec-
rementing an ASIL means violating any decomposition constraint, a mildest ascent 
direction is followed by incrementing the ASIL of the failure mode which results in 
the lowest system cost growth. At this moment a memory mechanism forbids reverse 
moves for a dynamic number of iterations p. This is important in avoiding returning to 
local optima. While descending, a similar mechanism exists, prohibiting reverse 
moves for p’ iterations; this allows introducing further diversity in the search by re-
ducing the possibility of switching behaviours between solutions. 
It should be noted that HiP-HOPS assigns ASILs to component failure modes in-
stead of the components themselves. This means that there is a greater level of re-
finement in this method, so for example an omission of an output can be assigned a 
different ASIL from a commission of the output if they lead to different effects at 
system level.  In turn, higher integrity will be required by the subcomponents that can 
directly or indirectly cause the omission. This feature is clearly useful for the case 
where a component presents more than one type of failure and therefore requirements 
can be more appropriately tailored in dealing with each one of them. Strictly speak-
ing, this approach does not agree with the ISO 26262 standard, which requires that a 
single ASIL is allocated to a component. HiP-HOPS can easily revert to this simpler 
model of allocation for compatibility with the standard, assigning an ASIL to a com-
ponent on the basis of its most severe failure mode. However, we believe that when 
requirements are allocated to subsystems which are further developed as complex 
networks of components, and when allocation of subsystem safety requirements to 
these components must be achieved, then a more refined and recursive approach 
where the "subsystem" can be treated as a "system" that has multiple SGs and ASIL 
requirements is preferable. This, we believe, could be a point worth considering in the 
future evolution of the ISO 26262 standard. 
Finally, HiP-HOPS SIL allocation extension should be regarded as a tool to inform 
decision making. Ultimately, it is up to the system designer to deliberate on the list of 
SIL allocation possibilities supplied by the tool and make decisions on how the sys-
tem architecture should evolve and how refined requirements derived from the Safety 
Goals are being distributed throughout the components. 
In the next section we apply our automated approach to a brake-by-wire system, 
and in the process demonstrate the impacts of ASIL-imposed cost consideration in 
deriving efficient allocation strategies. 
3 ASIL Allocation Cost Impacts on a Hybrid Braking System 
3.1 Hybrid Brake System Description 
In our work towards automating and optimising ASIL allocation we have been uti-
lizing the model of a Hybrid Braking System (HBS) for electrical vehicles as a case 
study to demonstrate our advances. The model is analysed in detail in [11] and is 
based on a system introduced by Castro et al [12] where braking is achieved using the 
combined efforts of two actuators: In-Wheel Motors (IWMs) and Electromechanical 
Brakes (EMBs). IWMs decrease the kinetic energy of a vehicle transforming it into 
electrical energy. The latter is fed to car’s powertrain batteries thus increasing driving 
range. However, the IWMs have limitations in regards to the amount of braking they 
can produce, namely at some speed regimes, or when the powertrain’s batteries are 
close to or at a full state of charge. In that way, EMBs are used dynamically with 
IWMs to provide the total braking required. The HBS is a brake-by-wire system 
where there is no mechanical or hydraulic link between the braking pedal and the 
actuators. We have developed a model for the system that for illustrative purposes 
only considers the braking of one wheel. The model is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Hybrid Braking System Model 
For the architecture of the HBS, it is considered when the driver presses the brak-
ing pedal, his actions are sensed and processed on a redundant Electronic Pedal Unit. 
Braking requests are generated for each of the vehicles wheels and are sent via a du-
plex communications bus; these demands are received at a local Wheel Node Control-
 
ler (WNC) that performs calculations for the division between electromechanical and 
electrical braking and sends commands accordingly to the power converters that con-
trol the two types of actuators. While braking, electrical power flows from the low 
voltage Auxiliary Battery to the EMB; the IWM, on the other hand, acts as a genera-
tor and provides energy for the Powertrain Battery. It needs to be noted that the ele-
ments of the power architecture should be regarded as subsystems composed of mul-
tiple components. The Powertrain Battery subsystem includes, for example, a Battery 
Management System, and the Power Converters integrate electronic driver circuits. 
For this illustrative case study we have considered two hazards: “Omission of brak-
ing" (H1) and “Braking with the wrong value” (H2). For the purpose of demonstra-
tion, H1 and H2 have been assigned with ASILs D and C, respectively. The two haz-
ards were linked to model output deviations in the following manner: 
 H1: Omission of IWM.out1 AND Omission of EMB.out1 
 H2: Wrong Value of IWM.out1 OR Wrong Value of EMB.out1 
We have derived failure expressions for each of the components of the HBS archi-
tecture [11]. HiP-HOPS then automatically synthesized fault trees for each of the 
hazards, and through their analysis unveiled: 
 1 single point of failure and 18 dual points of failure (i.e. minimal cutsets of order 
two) for H1; 
 10 single points of failure and 1 dual point of failure for H2. 
3.2 Experimentation with Different ASIL Cost Functions 
At this point we have obtained the failure information required to formulate the 
constraints for ASIL allocation and we now focus on the questions around using the 
cost functions to evaluate different ASIL allocation possibilities for the Hybrid Brak-
ing System. It is clear that there are different implications in developing the same 
component with each of the different ASILs. They are directly reflected in implemen-
tation and evaluation efforts, such as number of lines of code or of safety analysis 
execution, and consequently affect development and testing time as well as average 
and peak size of development and testing teams. This is deeply translated into costs, 
and therefore one is logically interested in finding which allocations minimize these 
costs across a system architecture. We have considered for this case study two func-
tions that indicate the relative costs between compliance with the different ASILs; 
these serve the purpose of demonstrating the cost influence in choosing a set of ASILs 
for a given system design, rather than being real world applicable figures. Earlier in 
the paper we have mentioned that one of the potential cost heuristics presented in the 
ISO 26262 LinkedIn forum indicated a larger cost jump between ASILs B and C than 
the ones from A to B and C to D. In meeting this consideration we have formulated 
the Experiential-I cost function shown in Table 1, where the cost between B and C 
(20) is twice the variation between any of the other ASILs (10). We have also estab-
lished a second one, Experiential-II, which maintains that the cost difference between 
ASILs B and C (15) is greater than from A to B and C to D (10). However, this func-
tion instead assumes that the cost jump between no safety considerations – ASIL QM 
– and ASIL A is the biggest (20). 
Table 1. ASIL Cost Heuristics 
Cost Heuristics / ASILs QM A B C D 
Experiential-I 0 10 20 40 50 
Experiential-II 0 20 30 45 55 
3.3 Cost Optimal ASIL Allocations for the Hybrid Braking System 
There are 24 failure modes in the HBS and 5 different ASILs that can be allocated 
to each one of them. This gives a total search space size of 524 (≈5.96 x 1016), which is 
still small enough to be finished with the exhaustive search techniques described in 
[3]; all optimal solutions are therefore unambiguously known. It is worth noting how-
ever, that our Tabu Search and Genetic Algorithms are able to find these allocations 
very efficiently. To allow discussion, we display the optimal solutions in Table 2.   
Table 2. HBS Optimal ASIL Allocations for Experiential-I and Experiential-II Cost Functions 




Cost: 585  
Components’ Failure Modes #1 #1 #2 #3 #4 
Braking Pedal Omission 4 4 4 4 4 
Braking Pedal Value 1 1 1 1 1 
Electronic Pedal Omission 1 2 4 4 4 4 
Electronic Pedal Omission 2 2 0 0 0 0 
Electronic Pedal Value 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Electronic Pedal Value 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Bus1 Omission 2 0 4 0 4 
Bus2 Omission 2 4 0 4 0 
WNC Omission 1 2 0 0 4 4 
WNC Omission 2 2 4 4 0 0 
WNC Value 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WNC Value 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Auxiliary Battery Omission 2 0 0 4 4 
Auxiliary Battery Value 1 1 1 1 1 
Powertrain Battery Omission 2 4 4 0 0 
Powertrain Battery Value 1 1 1 1 1 
EMB Power Converter Omission 2 0 0 4 4 
EMB Power Converter Value 1 1 1 1 1 
IWM Power Converter Omission 2 4 4 0 0 
IWM Power Converter Value 1 1 1 1 1 
EMB Omission 2 0 0 4 4 
EMB Value 1 1 1 1 1 
IWM Omission 2 4 4 0 0 
IWM Value 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
There are obvious differences between the results of using each of the cost heuris-
tics. The most immediate is that Experiential-I yields only one optimal allocation 
whereas Experiential-II yields four solutions with the same minimal cost. A closer 
look tells us that none of the optimal solutions of Experiential-II matches the one 
from Experiential-I. In this way, the choice of cost heuristic would have a definite 
impact on the integrity of specific components, for example, in deciding that an 
Omission Failure would impose development and validation measures of ASIL B 
(Experiential-I) or ASIL D/QM (Experiential-II) within component EMB. It is of 
course possible that for the HBS or another system, two different cost heuristics may 
work in a way that yields exactly the same optimal solution(s). However, what is 
important to remember is that the latter does not represent the general case, as we 
have demonstrated, and that the cost heuristic defines which allocation is cost-
optimal. We believe this is an important realisation and should kickstart some work 
towards defining a plausible and widely accepted cost heuristic that could both inform 
automated analyses, such as the one presented in this paper, and more generally in-
form decisions about how to optimise allocation of safety requirements during design 
refinement. 
3.4 Costs Refinement for More Accurate Optimal ASIL Allocations 
While the results above do demonstrate the need for a unified ASIL fitness func-
tion, one can argue that it is unrealistic to consider that the efforts associated with 
developing a processing unit of ASIL D are even close to those required for develop-
ing a High Voltage Battery subsystem with an equal integrity level. In meeting such 
concerns, we have refined our approach to allow a greater granularity in costs estima-
tion, providing the user with the ability to establish categories of components and 
assign relative cost weights to them. This feature is demonstrated below. 
Reutilising the HBS case study, we have divided the components of its architecture 
in to 3 categories, as shown in Table 3. Again this was done for the sole purpose of 
demonstration and more accurate and meaningful divisions may be found. In the same 
way, we have simplified the costs of individual failure modes for illustrative purpos-
es, and have considered that the efforts in dealing with Value and Omission failures 
are equal within the same component. 
Table 3. HBS Components Divided in 3 Categories 
Programmable Electronics Electronic Low Voltage Electronic High Voltage 
Electronic Pedal Auxiliary Battery IWM 
WNC EMB Power Converter IWM Power Converter 
Communication Buses EMB Powertrain Battery 
- Braking Pedal - 
 
We have assumed the Programmable Electronics category is the least expensive, 
and have used it as the base category for relative costs definition. We have estimated 
that the Electronic Low Voltage components are 3 times more expensive than Pro-
grammable Electronics. It is a given that when one adds features and/or redundancy 
to a system, the development costs increase. That is to say, growing complexity is 
usually tied to an increase in risk of defect and consequently the investment in safety 
measures escalates. In this way, taking into account the much larger complexity usu-
ally involved in both the software and hardware elements of a high voltage architec-
ture, Electronic High Voltage was assigned with the highest cost jump: 5 times the 
price of Programmable Electronics. Note that in this class we can find the main com-
ponents of the traction drive system with critical expensive parts and multiple control 
units with embedded software. We have reapplied the two cost functions of Table 1 
and have used them in conjunction with the cost weights of the 3 component catego-
ries we have devised. Our technique yielded the optimal solutions presented in Table 
4. 
Table 4. HBS Optimal ASIL Allocations for Experiential-I and Experiential-II Cost Functions 
With Cost Weights for Components Categories 




Cost: 1425  
Components FM #1 #1 #2 
Braking Pedal Omission 4 4 4 
Braking Pedal Value 1 1 1 
Electronic Pedal Omission 1 2 4 4 
Electronic Pedal Omission 2 2 0 0 
Electronic Pedal Value 1 1 1 1 
Electronic Pedal Value 2 0 0 0 
Bus1 Omission 2 0 4 
Bus2 Omission 2 4 0 
WNC Omission 1 4 4 4 
WNC Omission 2 0 0 0 
WNC Value 1 1 1 1 
WNC Value 2 1 1 1 
Auxiliary Battery Omission 4 4 4 
Auxiliary Battery Value 1 1 1 
Powertrain Battery Omission 0 0 0 
Powertrain Battery Value 1 1 1 
EMB Power Converter Omission 4 4 4 
EMB Power Converter Value 1 1 1 
IWM Power Converter Omission 0 0 0 
IWM Power Converter Value 1 1 1 
EMB Omission 4 4 4 
EMB Value 1 1 1 
IWM Omission 0 0 0 
IWM Value 1 1 1 
 
It is interesting to observe that using the cost weights between components catego-
ries reveals a new optimal solution for the Experiential-I function, whereas for Expe-
 
riential-II the optimal solutions are a subset of the ones encountered earlier (#3 and 
#4 of Table 3). Even so, the minimal cost solution of Experiential-I is still different to 
the ones yielded by Experiential-II. Moreover, the higher cost assigned to the Elec-
tronic High Power category clearly biased the optimal solutions towards utilizing low 
ASILs for the failure modes of its components. 
From the results above it was possible to demonstrate further that the use of differ-
ent cost heuristics impacts the optimal allocation of ASILs, this time in the presence 
of relative cost differences between categories of components. Furthermore, the use of 
more specific cost information allowed us to reveal optimal solutions which are likely 
to be more accurate. For the case of the Experiential-II cost function, two of the solu-
tions already identified as optimal in the previous section remained optimal following 
the refinement of costs. Finally, the introduction of categories and relative cost 
weights changes the nature of the optimisation problem; nonetheless, as in the previ-
ous step, our metaheuristics techniques were able to find the optimal solutions for this 
experiment, further validating their capabilities in dealing effectively with various 
formulations of the SIL allocation problem. 
4 Conclusions 
We have argued that the application of SIL allocation and decomposition is a 
complex combinatorial optimisation problem which must consider the optimisation of 
costs and not just the satisfaction of safety requirements constraints imposed by 
standardised SILs decomposition algebras. Through the use of a Hybrid Braking 
System case study we have demonstrated that such cost consideration allowed us to 
identify which are the most promising solutions, an effort that clearly contributes to a 
more efficient and cost-effective refinement of designs for safety-critical systems. Our 
example was equally important in revealing that different cost heuristics imply 
different optimality considerations; in this regard, work needs to be undertaken within 
each industry sector to identify plausible cost heuristics so that SIL allocation choices 
can be made with more confidence. 
All of the deliberations above were only possible due to the use of an automated 
framework that enabled the exploration of the vast number of ASIL allocation 
solutions in our case study in the presence of different ASIL cost functions. While a 
definitive cost heuristic is presently not available, our method is flexible in using any 
that a system designer finds more suitable. Furthermore, some industries, like the 
automotive industry where ISO 26262 was introduced in late 2011, are still 
undergoing a shift from developing entire systems via application of ISO26262 
towards processes in which there is reuse of Off the Shelf ASIL compliant parts. It is 
therefore likely that ASIL costs and their relationships might change, and it is 
important that our method maintains its versatility. Finally, our approach allows for 
designers to input costs in different levels of granularity; for example establishing 
categories of components with relative cost weights or even specific ASIL-dependant 
costs for each component. This further contributes to a more accurate determination 
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